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Abstract. This article describes some theoretical and methodological concerns with the approach of the
United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD) towards establishing the validity of the
counterintelligence-scope polygraph (CSP).
US Public Law 100-180 authorizes the DOD CSP Program in the effort to deter and detect activity
involving espionage, sabotage, and terrorism taken to harm US security interests. To this end, CSP
examinations are conducted on military personnel, DOD civilian employees, and DOD contractor
personnel. For example, according to the DOD Polygraph Program Annual Polygraph Report to Congress
for Fiscal Year 2000, 7,890 underwent a CSP examination. Of these, 7,688 were judged non-deceptive
based on physiological indices and provided no substantive information to the contrary (suggesting the
potential of security-inappropriate behavior), while 202 were judged otherwise and/or provided
substantive information suggesting the potential of security-inappropriate behavior. Of the latter 202,
194 received a favorable adjudication, 3 are still pending adjudication, 5 are pending investigation, and
no one received adverse action denying or withholding access to classified or sensitive information. And
of the 202, 11 provided substantive information suggesting the potential of security-inappropriate
behavior but continued to be judged as deceptive based on physiological indices.
What to make of the above data? One conclusion might be that no one needed to be examined in Fiscal
Year 2000, because no one experienced a change in security status. Another might be that 8 might
eventually require a change in security status. In this latter case, one might require a policy
determination of whether identifying 8 or less security-vulnerable individuals is worth the expenditure
of money, personnel, time, and materiel necessary to conduct 7,890 examinations. Yet another might be
that at least 3 of the 202 received a favorable adjudication even though physiological indices continued
to suggest deception--a conclusion that seems to cast a question on the whole notion of what the
physiological indices of deception denote.
The conclusion that common physiological measures of the CSP bear on deception is based on several
data sources. First, some individuals who tell the truth or lie on the CSP do look the way they should
look on the physiological measures. However, there are significant false positives and negatives that
detract from the investigative utility of this finding. Moreover, as the social context within which the
examination occurs approaches the reality of an actual counterintelligence one, the actual pattern of
true and false positive and negatives becomes more and more unknowable. In this regard, the anecdotal
information provided by the Report that describes individually compelling cases of CSP examinees who
were forthcoming about substantive information is not helpful to address this matter.
Second, some individuals in interludes before an imminent examination or during an examination--but
before allegedly significant physiological indices of deception appear--do indeed "spill the beans" about
security-inappropriate behavior. This finding, of course, does not bear on the validity of the physiological
indices but on the social psychological phenomenon of the "bogus pipeline."
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Third, perseverative recitations of the CSP's validity by individuals whose own political and material
power as well as professional reputation are dependent on beliefs in this validity often serve to
reinforce the very conclusion of the CSP's validity. Yet between belief and Truth there can be disparity.
Fourth, there are perseverative recitations of the CSP's validity by others who believe it would be
contrary to the security interests of the US to assert otherwise--regardless of the CSP's validity.
Ironically, those must dedicated to US strength may be most weakening it.
Yet the CSP continues make up over 70% of the overall DOD Polygraph Program. This is the case, even
though the US Government's own data supporting the validity the Test for Espionage and Sabotage
(TES)--the primary CSP examination--are extremely tenuous. However, instead of going back to the
drawing board to assess how the reductionist approach of physiological indices suggesting complex
social psychological phenomena makes epistemological sense, DOD is marching on with ever more
esoteric research projects and contracts intended to link physiological measures such as
electroencephalographic, magnetoencephalographic, novel electrodermal, laser-doppler vibrometric,
"Vericatric" (voice-based), and infrared thermal imaging data directly to deception or indirectly through
something called psycholophysiological "stress."
Although recent efforts to increase consistency of polygraphic technique and requirements for
continuing education of polygraph examiners are positive steps, the notion that the emperor may be
wearing no clothes may not be deceptive or must at least await its final adjudication. (See Department
of Defense Polygraph Program Annual Polygraph Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2000.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/dod-2000.htn; Honts, C.R. (1992). Counterintelligence
Scope Polygraph (CSP) test found to be poor discriminator. Forensic Reports, 5, 215-218; Honts, C.R.
(1991). The emperor's new clothese: Application of polygraph tests in the American workplace. Forensic
Reports, 4, 91-116; Iacono, W.G., & Lykken, D.T. (1997). The validity of the lie detector: Two surveys of
scientific opinion. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 426-433; Saxe, L., & Ben Shakhar, G. (1999).
Admissibility of polygraph tests: The application of scientific standards post-Daubert. Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, 5, 203-223; Terpstra, D.E., Kethley, R.B., Foley, R.T., & Limpaphayom, W. (2000). The
nature of litigation surrounding five screening devices. Public Personnel Management, 29, 43-54.)
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